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Market theory is often concerned only with cen-
tralised markets. In this paper, we consider a mar-
ket that is distributed over a network, allowing us
to characterise spatially (or temporally) segregated
markets. The effect of this modiﬁcation on the be-
haviour of a market populated by simple trading
agents was examined. It was demonstrated that an
agent’s ability to identifythe optimummarket price
is positively correlated with its network connectiv-
ity. A better connected agent receives more infor-
mation and, as a result, is better able to judge the
market state. The ZIP trading agent algorithm is
modiﬁed in light of this result. Simulations reveal
that trading agents which take account of the qual-
ity of the information that they receive are better
able to identify the optimum price within a market.
1 Introduction
The study of the centralised market has been one of the key
areas of economic research for many years. There have been
many attempts to understand the behaviour of markets and
that of the traders within them. These attempts range from
analyticalstudies , (e.g.,DeLonget al., 1990),to experiments
on real subjects , (e.g., the studies of Smith, 1962).
In addition to analytical and experimental results, the use
of simulation has become increasingly important [Gode and
Sunder,1993; Cliff and Bruten, 1997;Gjerstad and Dickhaut,
1998;Das et al., 2001;Farmeret al., 2005]. Inparticularsim-
ulation has allowed the modelling of trader micro-behaviour,
which would be analytically intractable and experimentally
time consuming. In virtually all of these micro studies, the
market is assumed to occupy a single location. All bids and
offers are submitted in the same place, where all others may
see and respond to them. Not all markets, however, are like
this. Retail markets, for instance, are spatially embedded and
consequentlyimpose costs in terms of the time and effort that
it takes to visit other traders and acquire information. As a
consequence of this, it is usually impossible for a trader to
visit all possible partners. Instead, the trader will probably
restrict information gathering to nearest neighbours, or key
operators in the market. In this case the market no longer has
a central location to which information is submitted and, as a
result, different traders within the market may have access to
different histories of bids and offers.
It is not only spatially embedded markets which may limit
the ubiquity of market information. Traders in a ﬁnancial
market have ready access to all trading information. How-
ever, in this case the shear quantity of information may seg-
regate the market. The traders incur very little cost in gath-
ering information, instead the main cost is that of analysis.
Analysinginformationtakes time, meaningthat it may be im-
possible for a single trader to study and accurately respond to
all of the information within the market. Traders are there-
fore likely to ignore some of the information available and
fail to take it into account when making decisions. In effect
the trader will not be hearing some of the information even
though it is available in principle. One possible consequence
of this is to focus the attention of traders on a small subset of
market products, leading to specialisation. There is, however,
animportantdifferencebetweenthesecases. Althougha mar-
ket may be segregated in terms of information ﬂow, trade is
not as restricted as it is in the spatially extended case.
In either of these cases, however, assumptions about cen-
tralisation of market processes no longer hold. Different
traders within the market have access to different histories
of bids and shouts and, potentially, a propensity to deal with
particular partners rather than others. These problems aren’t
necessarily limited to human traders. It is possible to con-
ceive of markets that are sufﬁciently large and complex that
even computer programs would ﬁnd it inefﬁcient to analyse
all information present, or consider trading with every agent
in the market. Recently models havestarted to appearthat ex-
amine these types of problems. For instance Wilhite [2001]
and Bell [1998] have both examined trading scenarios that
take place across networks.
This paper aims to investigate the valuation of information
within distributedmarkets. As has previouslybeendescribed,
traders in these markets will have access to different infor-
mation sources and therefore different pictures of the market
state. This will be particularly apparent if some traders are
more connected than others, i.e., they have more information
sources and trading partners. These better connected traders
are, on average, likely to have a better understanding of the
market than those traders who are less well connected. This
paperwillﬁrstexaminetheadvantagethisinequalityprovides
to the better connected traders along with the effect this hason trading within the market.
The effect of this imbalance is important because to some
extentthe degreeto whicha trader is connectedcan be altered
by the trader itself. It is well known that resources must be
expended to gather information and that properly analysing
information takes time. In many situations it is possible for a
trader to change the proportion of its resources dedicated to
gathering and analysing information,however, it is important
to know under which circumstances to do this. This paper
will begin to investigate this question. It will consider a mar-
ket where both trade and information ﬂow are restricted in
a manner represented by an explicit, ﬁxed network of possi-
ble agent-agent interactions. The network will govern which
agents are able to communicate with each other and, there-
fore, which agents are able to trade with each other. Impor-
tantly, this network will not be complete (fully connected),
i.e., some traders within the market will not be able to com-
municate directly with others. In this initial work we wish to
gain an understanding of the value of information in a sim-
ple segmented market so the market network is ﬁxed. Trader
are not permitted to change their connections during the sim-
ulation. In future we hope to develop this system so as to
better understand the circumstances in which it is favourable
to change connectivity. The market used for these simula-
tions is very simple, it is not designed to reﬂex the intricacies
of any particular distributed market in particular. Instead it
is designed to provide general insight into the valuation of
information in segmented markets. The results found within
this paper could be applied to any markets where information
cannot ﬂow freely. This includes retail markets, OTC mar-
kets, and many others.
This model will differ from previous work in that it will
model the micro-behaviour of the traders. In both of the pre-
vious studies mentioned above [Wilhite, 2001; Bell, 1998],
trade between agents was abstract. When two agents were
chosen to trade, their utility functions were examined and an
allocationofresourceswas calculatedsuch thatthe utilities of
both agents were increased. In this study, we will use a well-
established tradingagent algorithmto investigatethe effect of
the market constraints on the ability of agents to identify the
optimum price. In addition, an attempt will be made to mod-
ify the trading agent algorithm to better cope with, or exploit,
this situation.
2 Method
This section will ﬁrst describe the structure and function of
themarketsthatwill beinvestigated,beforedetailingthetrad-
ing agents that will populate them.
2.1 Network Generation
Trading networks were constructed in which nodes repre-
sented traders and edges represented bi-directional commu-
nication channels. There are many possible network conﬁgu-
rations which could be investigated for their effect on market
performance, including lattices, Erd˝ os-R´ enyi random graphs,
small worlds, and graphs resulting from preferential attach-
ment. This paper will focus on the latter class of networks
since they exhibit some interesting properties, including the
presence of well-connected “hubs”, which have an intuitive
appeal in terms of real world markets, where it would be ex-
pected that certain major investment banks would be much
better connected than individual investors.
An existing preferential attachment scheme is employed
here [Nobleet al., 2004]. A networkofN unconnectednodes
is gradually populated with Nm edges. In random order,
each node is consulted, and allocated an edge linking it to
a second node chosen according to probabilities calculated
as pi =( ni + δ)P. Here, P is the exponent of preferential
attachment and remains constant, n is node’s current degree
(numberofedges),andδ is asmall constant(0.1forallresults
reported here) that ensures unconnected nodes have a non-
zero probabilityof gaininga neighbour. Self-connectionsand
multiple connections between the same pair of nodes were
not allowed. All probabilities, pi, were updated after every
edge was added. After m cycles through the population, the
network was complete. Note that every node will have a min-
imum of m edges, and a maximum of N − 1.
Markets explored here have a relatively high preferential
exponent of P =1 .5 in order to generate networks that dis-
play a wide range of degrees. For all results reported here,
m =1 0 . Initial tests showed that if m was signiﬁcantly less
than this value, the market failed to converge as few agents
were able to trade with their limited number of neighbours.
2.2 Auction Dynamics
The market functioned according to an adapted continuous
double auction mechanism. The standard continuous double
auction allows buyers and sellers to submit bids to the rest
of the market for consideration at any time. First, in order to
simplify the implementation of a continuous double auction
on a network, we adopted the system presented by Cliff and
Bruten [1997]. In their simulations, the auction mechanism
acts in discrete time and has no orderbook. Each time period,
one active agent (one who is still able to trade) is selected at
randomto makeanofferorabid. Theotheragentsinthemar-
ket are then polledin randomorderforresponsesto the shout.
If the response and the shout cross then a trade is executed at
the ﬁrst shouted price, if not the next agent is polled. If no
trader accepts the shout then the shout is removed. Second,
we limit anagent’s ability to tradesuch that theyare onlyable
to make offers to, or accept bids from, their network neigh-
bours. Each market was simulated for a ﬁxed number of time
steps.
2.3 Trading Agents
Here, the ZIP trading algorithm is used to govern agent be-
haviour. ZIP, or Zero Intelligence Plus, agents were created
by Cliff and Bruten [1997] in response to work by Gode and
Sunder [1993], who created the “Zero Intelligence” trading
algorithm in some of the ﬁrst agent-based market simula-
tions. The Zero Intelligence algorithm was designed to be
the simplest possible algorithm that would allow trade to oc-
cur in a market. Two types of Zero Intelligence trader were
introduced. The ﬁrst, unconstrained traders (ZI-U), choose
shout prices at random from a uniform distribution across the
whole range of possible prices permitted, disregarding any
limit prices. It was found that markets populated by thesetraders exhibited none of the normal properties associated
with markets, such as convergence to the equilibrium price.
The second type of zero intelligence traders (ZI-C) were con-
strained in the range of prices that could be shouted. Shout
prices were again drawn at random from a uniform distribu-
tion. However, this distribution was now constrained by an
agent’s limit price. In the case of sellers, shouts were con-
strained to be greater than the limit price, while in the case of
buyers, shouts had to be less than the speciﬁed limit price.
Importantly, markets populated by traders using this algo-
rithm were shown to behave analogously to real markets in
that they convergedto the theoreticalequilibriumprice [Gode
and Sunder, 1993]. This was interpreted as indicating that
the market mechanism itself was the most signiﬁcant factor
in market behaviour, and that the design of the trading algo-
rithm was not as important. Cliff and Bruten [1997],h o w -
ever, showed this to be incorrect, demonstrating that the con-
vergence observed during each trading period was an artifact
of the supply and demand schedules used by Gode and Sun-
der. They demonstrated that, for a certain type of supply and
demandschedule that was close to symmetric, the probability
distributionof likelyZI-C bidsandofferswouldresult incon-
vergenceto the mean price. They then performedsimulations
to verify these results with a broader range of supply and de-
mand schedules. For non-symmetricschedules, markets pop-
ulated by ZI-C traders failed to converge, or converged to a
non-market-equilibriumvalue.
The ZIP agent differs from the ZI-C agent in that it learns
from the market. Each ZIP trader has a proﬁt margin asso-
ciated with its limit price. In the case of buyers, the proﬁt
margin is the amount by which they wish to undercut their
limit price to make a trade, and in the case of sellers, it is
the amount by which they wish to exceed there limit price.
When a ZIP trader shouts, the price is constrained by its limit
price and proﬁt margin. The agent uses the market’s response
to its activity (and the observable activity of others) to up-
date its proﬁt margin. For instance, buyers observe the bids
made on the market and whether they are accepted or not
and adjust their proﬁt margin accordingly (for full details of
this algorithm, see Cliff and Bruten, 1997). The ZIP algo-
rithm employs the Widrow-Hoff learning rule with momen-
tum [Widrow and Hoff, 1960] to adapt these proﬁt margins
throughouteach agent’s lifetime—maximisingfor each agent
the possibility of makinga proﬁtabletrade. This learningrule
allows the agents to rapidly converge on the optimal price,
while the momentum term allows blips in the market to be
ignored. Unlike ZI-C, ZIP agents are capable of ﬁnding the
market equilibriumundera wide rangeof supplyand demand
schedules.
Here, each ZIP agent was initialised with a random proﬁt
margin drawn from a uniform distribution [0.05,0.35]. Each
agent was also initialised with a random learning rate drawn
from a uniformdistribution [0.1,0.5]and random momentum
value drawn from a uniform distribution [0.2,0.8].
3 Initial Results
Experimentswere performedusingmarketspopulatedby100
ZIP traders. Each agent was randomly allocated a limit price
in the range [100,200], and either the ability to buy one unit
or sell one unit of an unnamed indivisible commodity. Each
market simulation lasted for 400 time steps. Markets were
constrained by networks, constructed as described above,
with P =1 .5 and m =1 0 , and all markets operated through
the continuous double auction mechanism.
Figure 1(left) shows the price deviation from the theoreti-
cal optimum averaged over forty thousand repetitions. Each
agent’s valuation was obtained at each time step of each rep-
etition, and the average calculated. Notice that timeseries
are shown for agents with connectivity rank ranging from 1 st
(most well-connected) to 100th (least well-connected). Over
time, the average price shouted by all agents, regardless of
connectivity, approaches the equilibrium price. This is to
be expected, as it is a fundamental property of markets that
they tend to converge to equilibrium. The agents do not all
converge at the same rate, however. Those agents who have
mostconnectionsconvergefastest. Agentswhoaremorecon-
nected receive more frequent information and so have a bet-
ter impression of the state of the market. They are, therefore,
better able to accurately judge the equilibrium price.
Agents converge on a market price that deviates from the
equilibrium price. This is due to the allocation of supply and
demand. As the market converges, it will become increas-
ingly difﬁcult for agents who have been allocated limit prices
beyondthe market’s theoreticalequilibriumpriceto ﬁnd part-
ners prepared to trade with them. Since agents cannot alter
their limit price, and are not prepared to trade at a value be-
low it, some will effectively price themselves out of the mar-
ket. Indeed, some agents will be unable to trade despite the
presenceofwilling partnersin the marketas a whole,because
they will not have a neighbour prepared to trade with them.
3.1 Extension
As described, traders in the market assume that all of the in-
formation that they hear is of equal quality, regardless of its
source, i.e., the ZIP learning rule makes no distinction be-
tween the information it receives from different individuals.
It has been demonstrated,however,that there is a relationship
between agent connectivity and accuracy of valuation. How,
therefore, could the traders take advantage of this fact?
In reality, it is known that some sources of information are
of better quality than others. This may be for a number of
reasons, including market experience, quality of information
sources, reputation, or size. For reasons such as these, people
are more likely to trust information about ﬁnancial markets
obtained from a market trader than information from a pub
landlord. Alternatively they are more likely to trust the man-
ager of a large importer than a market trader for information
about the fruit market.
In order to incorporate this factor into the model, the
traders were modiﬁed to weight the quality of information
received. Information judged to be of high quality was
weighted strongly when adapting proﬁt margins. There are
many (possibly sophisticated) ways to evaluate the quality of
information received by an agent, especially as each agent
has multiple sources of information each of which may have
sent messages several times in the past. It could be possible




































































Figure 1: Absolute deviation from optimum price averaged over 40000 runs for agents ranked in decreasing order of connec-
tivity for (left) standard ZIP agents, and (right) ZIP agents with a learning rule adapted to exploit market topology information.
comparing the most recent bid received to all previous bids
receivedfrom that and other traders, and the relative informa-
tion quality of those bids. The complexity of such an algo-
rithm, however, would seem to be inappropriate for a model
of this simplicity at this stage. Here, a very simple method
for evaluating the quality of information was implemented,
based on the results presented above.
ZIP agents adapt their price using the Widrow-Hoff rule
every time they hear a shout from another trader in the mar-
ket. This rule includes a learning rate which inﬂuences how
quickly an agent is able to learn. Currently a ﬁxed learning
rate is assigned to each individual in the simulation from a
uniform distribution [0.1,0.5].
In order for the agents to take account of informationqual-
ity, the learning rate was modiﬁed so that instead of being
ﬁxed, the value would be calculated for each piece of infor-
mation received. This alteration results in ZIP agents placing
more weight on information obtained from well-connected
individuals than from less well-connected individuals.
The Widrow-Hoff “delta” learning rule was modiﬁed by
removing the learning rate and replacing it with the function
f(s,r), where s and r are the sender and recipient of a piece














log(Rmax) : E(s) <E (r)
The function, E, gives the number of neighbours (degree)
of an agent, and Rmax is the largest ratio of edges between
two adjacent agents within the market. This adaptive learn-
ing rate weights information according to relative connectiv-
ity within the market, i.e., the ratio of the sender’s connec-
tivity to the recipient’s connectivity determines the learning
rate. When the sender is more highly connected than the re-
ceiver the information received is more likely to be accurate
and so more adaptation occurs. When the receiver is more
connected, the receiver’s current picture of the market state is
likely to be more accurate than the senders and so less adap-
tation occurs. The value is normalised by the maximum ra-
tio present in the market in order to ensure that the learning
rate remains within the same bounds as standard ZIP traders.
Connectivity ratios are log-scaled to ensure that learning rate
adaptation is sensitive to the small differences in connectiv-
ity that characterise most sender-recipient pairs in a network
generated by a preferential attachment process (where there
will be only a few very well-connected individuals).
4 Results
Figure 1(right) shows the results obtained with the modiﬁed
learning rule. All other parameters are the same as the previ-
ous scenario. As before the deviation of the valuations de-
creases over time. Again the most connected agents con-
verge more quickly than the least connected agents. Figure
2(left) affords an easier comparison between the two stud-
ies. The least well-connected agents converge more quickly
whenusingthemodiﬁedlearningrulethanwhenusingaﬁxed
learning rate. At all times they have a lower deviation from
the optimum price than agents using a ﬁxed learning rate.
By the end of the market they are signiﬁcantly closer to the
optimum price than those using ﬁxed learning rates (t-test,
p<0.0001). Over longer experiments they may, however,
eventually converge to the same value. The convergence of
the better-connected agents is very similar, with or without
the presence of the modiﬁed learning rule, although conver-
gence is slightly retarded in the former case. By the end of
the market, however, both groups have attained very simi-
lar values. It must be remembered that, as a consequence
of the preferential attachment scheme that generates the mar-
ket network, the distribution of agent connectivities exhibits
a power law. Poorly-connected individuals vastly outnumber
well-connectedagents. As a result, even if the adaptivelearn-
ing rate does signiﬁcantly retard the convergence of well-
connected agents, only a very small number of traders will
suffer (although these agents may in some sense be of above
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Figure 2: Absolute deviation from optimum price averaged over 40000 runs for (left) the most and least connected agent in
each experimental condition, and (right) for the single monitored agents in markets designed to control for learning rate.
Before discussing these results further, a slight bias intro-
duced by the adaptive learning rate scheme must be dealt
with. Although the adaptive learning rate is constrained to lie
within the same bounds that constrain regular ZIP agents, the
average learning rate employed by the adaptive ZIP agents
is higher than that of standard ZIP traders. Recall that
there are a greater number of weakly connected agents than
strongly connected agents. In the case of the weakly con-
nected agents, nearly all of their neighbours will be at least
as well-connected, if not better-connected. This means that
the typical learning rate employed by an agent will rarely be
below the population mean. As a result, the average learn-
ing rate of these agents is increased, so faster convergence is
not necessarily surprising. In order to demonstrate that the
modiﬁed rule has an effect on convergence above that which
would be expected to result from a simple increase in average
learning rate, a further study was designed.
Two equal-sized groups of standard ZIP agents are ini-
tialised, the ﬁrst group forming a completely connected
clique, while the second forms a minimally connected ring.
The quality of information being exchangedin the ﬁrst group
should, therefore,tend to be much higher than that being traf-
ﬁcked in the second group. A ﬁnal modiﬁed ZIP trader with
anequalnumberofconnectionsto randomagentswithineach
group is added to the market. This agent does not make any
shouts, nor respond to shouts. It simply adapts its valuation
based on the information it hears. This study was run under
two conditions: using a standard ZIP algorithm for the ﬁnal
agent, or using the adaptive learning rule instead. In the sec-
ond condition, the connections from the ﬁnal agent to the rest
of the market are ignored by the adaptive learning rate rule,
as they are never used to convey information to the market.
In the second condition, it is possible to set the number of
connections from the ﬁnal agent such that its average learn-
ing rate is equal to the average learning rate of a standard ZIP
agent (0.3 in the studies reported here). The learning rates
of the modiﬁed ZIP traders lie within the range [0.1,0.5].
The followingequationforthe averageadaptivelearningrate,
¯ η(n), for a modiﬁed ZIP trader with n neighbours may be
written given that all agents within each of the two groups
share the same connectivity and the ﬁnal agent has an equal





















Where Emax is the connectivity of agents in the fully con-
nected group and Emin is the connectivity of agents in the
weakly connected ring, and n is the number of connections
of the ﬁnal agent. If we require this average to be the stan-




Here, we employ a fully-connected clique of ﬁfty-one
agents and a ring of ﬁfty-one agents, giving Emax =5 0and
Emin =2 , requiring n =1 0connections in total, or ﬁve
connections to each population.
The results of 40000 repetitions are shown in ﬁgure
2(right). As can be seen, the modiﬁed ZIP agent using an
adaptive learning rate converges faster and to a signiﬁcantly
lower asymptotic value than the standard ZIP agent (t-test,
p<0.0001). Hence, the adaptive learning rate rule has a
positive effect on convergence beyond simply increasing the
learning rate.
5 Discussion
In this paper we wished to explore the effect on convergence
of market structure in terms of trader connectivity. The result
obtained in the ﬁrst part of this paper clearly show that the
more connected an agent is, the faster it is able to converge,
and the closer it is able to get to the optimum price. In the
short term the more well-connected traders receive more in-
formation, and so are able to adapt faster. In the longer term,
this greater volume of information means that they have a
better overall picture of the market, and so may evaluate the
optimum price more accurately.As a consequence, the source of a shout has an impact on
the quality of the information obtained. This was demon-
stratedbyfactoringinformationqualityintothe Widrow-Hoff
adaptationruleviaanadaptivelearningrate. Ourresultsshow
that agents who employ this strategy value the commodity
more accurately in the majority of cases.
The fact that a small number of well-connected agents do
worse by adopting this adaptive learning rate rule demon-
strates that it is not of universal utility. The reason for this
may be related to who these individuals are connected to. In
the market structures studied here, for the vast majority of the
time, highly connected agents will receive their information
from less well-connectedindividuals. Since such information
is judged (by the learning rule) to be of relatively low quality,
less attention is paid to it. This may be a good decision in
the long run. However, when the market opens this proves
to be detrimental. At the beginning of a market every agent
has a random valuation. Therefore, it would pay to attend to
any information, even if it originates from poorly connected
individuals. Whereas the most poorly-connected individuals
do just this, the most well-connectedagents tend to trust their
initial valuation to a greater extent. This results in the slower
initial convergence seen in the most well-connected agents.
One might imagine that since these well-connected, but ini-
tially misguided individuals have a very signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on their neighbours, they might retard the market’s conver-
gence as a whole. Results suggest that this does not occur for
the topologies considered here, but one could imagine mar-
ket structures in which the hubs are so large and scarce that
they could disturb the market for some time. As it stands, the
simple adaptive learning rate rule could obviously be mod-
iﬁed to better suit the more well-connected individuals, or,
alternatively, separate rules could be used.
The adaptive learning rate rule used in this paper is very
simple. It was chosen in order to demonstrate that the quality
of an informationsourcecouldbe an importantfactorin mak-
ing trading decisions, and that this could be used by trading
agents to improvetheir valuations. It is not an attempt to pro-
vide an optimal rule. Their are many other possible factors
which could be incorporated in order to make this rule more
sophisticated.
As it currentlystands this rule has several weaknesses. The
most obvious is that it relies on information which may not
be publicly known. First, it uses the maximum connectivity
ratio present within the market in order to normalise the rate
of change. This is necessary in order to ensure that learning
rates were scaled to fall within the same range as that em-
ployed by standard ZIP agents. Second, whenever an agent
adapts, it uses the connectivity of the shouter in order to de-
termine how much attention should be paid to the shout. In
real situations it seems unlikely that an agent would have ac-
cess to either of these kinds of information. In order for an
agent to know the maximum connectivity ratio, it would be
necessary for the agent to know how the whole of the market
was structured. For the simulations reported here, this infor-
mation is easy to obtain. However, in real markets it seems
highly unlikely that this information would be available. The
only probable way for an agent to know the whole market
structure is to be in contact with every agent in the market.
If this were possible, then it is likely that other agents would
also be completely connected, and an individual agent’s con-
nectivity would cease to be an issue. The connectivity of an
individual trader may be even more difﬁcult to obtain. In the
studies reported here, every agent knows its own connectiv-
ity and that of its neighbours. In reality it is unlikely that the
agent would possess this second piece of information, or per-
haps even the ﬁrst. The only realistic way to determine how
well-connected another agent is, is to obtain the information
from the agent directly. As has been suggested, however, it
seems unlikely that agents would want to give this informa-
tion away, as our results suggest that it is valuable.
This begs the question, if it is impossible to obtain the nec-
essary connectivity information in reality, what practical sig-
niﬁcance do the results presented herehave? Althoughit may
be impossible to obtain exact connectivity information, it is
not impossible to generate an evaluation of the information
quality of ones trading partners in a real market. Moreover,
informationquality can be measured via indicators other than
connectivity. In the case of human markets, traders may im-
plicitly evaluate many aspects of their trading partners when
deciding the signiﬁcance of a piece of information. These as-
pects may include estimates of the partner’s size (is it an in-
vestment bank with many traders or is it an sole trader), repu-
tation, marketposition, marketexperience,etc. As yet, it may
be difﬁcult for an artiﬁcial trader operating in a real market,
i.e., the stock market, to do this, due to the complexity of the
information processing involved. It could be possible, how-
ever, for such automatic trading algorithms to be provided
with human-generated estimates of known trading partners.
The problembecomes even more complexin the case of mar-
kets solely populatedby artiﬁcial tradingagents. However,as
mentioned above, if sufﬁcient information is available it may
be possibly to analyse the time series of shouts by a partic-
ular agent in order to estimate the quality of its information.
There is obviously a great deal of further work to be done
in this area, particularly in examining the effect of different
evaluation rules and the effect of different market structures
on market (and agent) behaviour.
This paper has been more concerned with the performance
of the market as a whole rather than the situation of any one
group of traders. There are, however, many interesting ques-
tion which can be asked about the ways in which information
may be used. In particular it would be interesting to consider
how the better connected traders could exploit their advan-
tageous positions to make a larger proﬁt and also how they
could exploit the knowledge that other agents gain an advan-
tage by considering information quality. In order to prop-
erly understand these issues, however, it may be necessary to
make the market more sophisticated. Currently, traders may
only trade once. This effectively limits the ways in which
traders can exploit information because as soon as a trader
makes a trade they are effectively removed from the market.
As aconsequencesomeareasofthemarketmaybecomestag-
nant as all available trades are made. This could be remedied
by the introduction of a continuous ﬂow of buy and sell or-
ders entering the market. Allowing traders to interact multi-
ple times and to develop more sophisticated strategies, whilst
preventing the market from stagnating.In this paper only a small (but signiﬁcant) difference be-
tween traders using the new strategy and those not using it
is demonstrated. Two points should be noted, ﬁrstly this rule
was not chosen as an optimal rule for increasing valuation
accuracy, instead it was chosen for its simplicity in demon-
strating a point. Secondly the market employed in these ex-
periments is by its nature “one-shot” in that all traders only
trade once for one unit of the commodity. This naturally lim-
its the opportunities for making proﬁts, in particular in elimi-
nates reselling. In real markets, however, this is not the case.
Traders in real markets often trade many times for large vol-
umes of products. A small increase in accuracy when dealing
with large volumes may make a signiﬁcant difference to the
proﬁt obtained. In the extreme case, foreign exchange mar-
kets have a turn over in the region of one trillion dollars a
day. Even very small increases in valuation accuracy in con-
texts such as these can results in huge increases in proﬁts.
6 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that simple markets populated
by simple trading agents may function despite trading con-
straints represented by an explicit, ﬁxed network of possible
agent-agent interactions. We have not attempted to classify
or analyse the effect of topology in general. However, for
one particular type of market, some interesting and encour-
aging results have been shown. We have demonstrated that
more well-connected agents have an informational advantage
within a market. Having more neighboursensures that a trad-
ing agent has a better picture of the market and, as a result, a
better valuation of the commodity being traded. By making a
simple modiﬁcation to the ZIP trading algorithm to take ac-
count of this observation,improvedperformancewas demon-
strated for all but the most well-connected individuals.
In a more general sense, these results show that if it is pos-
sible to estimate thequalityofa trader’sknowledge,it maybe
beneﬁcial to factor this information into the way in which the
trading agent learns. This result isn’t necessarily restricted
to trading agents. In general, in any market with incomplete
information ﬂow, it may be beneﬁcial to pay more attention
to the most signiﬁcant players within the market. However,
care is necessary. Currently the ZIP trading strategy does not
allow the more well-connected agents to exploit their infor-
mational advantage. However, this could be changed fairly
easily. It is not difﬁcult to imagine methods that allow simple
trading agents to exploit informational advantages in order
to make proﬁt. It is, however, difﬁcult to imagine ways in
which to modify trading strategies in order to prevent this oc-
curring in network based markets. The only solution to this
problem may be to design market systems which minimise
informational asymmetries. This may require research into
more sophisticated market mechanisms to replace the contin-
uous double auction. Alternatively, it may require the addi-
tion of completely new processes to the market. For instance,
a process analogous to the ﬁnancial press may allow agents
to regularly gain an overview of the behaviour of the entire
market.
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